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Introduction 
Iast year, Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act  of 
1986, which fundamentally restructures and sim- 
plifies the federal income tax system. Beginning 
in 1987, individuals and corporations face much 
simpler federal income tax rules that contain 
lower marginal tax rates. 
There is widespread speculation 
about the effects of such sweeping federal income 
tax reform. Economists, policymakers, and politi- 
cians are debating the extent to which the new 
tax rules could adversely affect specific economic 
sectors or groups, particularly capital-intensive 
indumies, certain income classes of  individual 
taxpayers, real estate, and the banking industry. 
In the commercial banking indus- 
try, the new tax rules will affect banks at a time 
when the commercial banking system is under- 
going profound structural changes that are erod- 
ing the industry's ability to consistently generate 
healthy profits on traditional banking products 
and services. During the balance of the 1980s and 
into the 19!90s, commercial banks will face sev- 
eral critical issues, including risk-based capital 
standards, deregulation, broader geographic 
competition, and possibly increasing competition 
fiom nonbank companies like Sears, Roebuck 
and Company, and Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. 
This article examines how tax 
reform could potentially affect the future tax lia- 
bility of commercial banks. The analysis concen- 
trates on Ohio banks and estimates the 1985 
taxes they paid under the old corporate federal 
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income tax rules. This benchmark estimate is 
then compared to a similar estimate made using 
the new tax rules. 
The analysis calculates the tax bur- 
den for both small-to-medium and large Ohio 
banks so that we can detect disproportional 
effects of the new tax rules, if any, on different- 
size Ohio banks. It is presumed that large banks 
($500 million or more in assets) should be 
affected more adversely than small-to-medium 
banks (with assets less than $500 million) 
because the new corporate tax code eliminates 
more existing tax preferences for large banks. 
I.  Old Versus New Corporate Federal 
Income Tax Rules 
Under the new federal corporate income tax 
regime, commercial banks will lose a substantial 
amount of  their tax preferences, or deductions, 
that they relied upon to reduce their taxable 
income. In return, they will face much lower 
marginal tax rates. 
It is the intention of Congress that 
the new tax code's lower corporate tax rates 
should not entirely offset the loss of commercial 
bank tax preferences. Consequently, the typical 
bank should pay a higher tax bill in 1987. Con- 
gress revised the federal income tax code so that 
approximately $150 billion of federal taxes during 
the next five years will shift fiom individuals to 
corporations. According to Congressional esti- 
mates, the commercial banking industry, one of 
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Taxes Than Their Nonfhancial Counterparts? 
There has been much controversy about whether or 
not banks have paid a tax liability that is considerably 
less than that paid by nonfinancial corporations. 
According to estimates by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce, corpora- 
tions paid an effective average federal income tax rate 
in the 23- to 25-percent range from 1980 to 1983. 
Studies that estimate the direct tax liabil- 
ity of commercial banks find that the banking industry 
has indeed paid a relatively lower federal tax liability. 
One recent study estimates the tax liabilities of all prof- 
itable banks nationwide during 1985.' This nationwide 
estimate finds that all banks together paid an average 
1985 direct-tax rate of approximately 11 percent. An even 
lower average rate has been estimated by the  Joint Com- 
mittee on Taxation (JCT) for the tax liability of the 
nation's largest banks.2 The JCT finds that large banks, 
which presumably are better managers of their tax liabil- 
ity, have either paid no taxes or have paid an extremely 
low tax rate (less than 5 percent) as a percentage of 
their net income in recent years. The JCT cautions, 
however, that this low-tax-rate estimate may understate 
these banks' true economic tax burden because it fails 
to include indirect taxes paid by them. 
Surveys by the Bank Administration Insti- 
tute (BAI), a bank-sponsored research and educational 
organization, attempt to adjust for indirect bank taxes.3 
BAI incorporates two types of indirect bank taxes: one 
is for the opportunity cost of holding non-interest- 
bearing accounts with the Federal Reserve for monetary 
policy purposes, and the other adjusts for foregone 
earnings on lower-yielding tax-exempt municipal obli- 
gations. According to BAI's surveys, banks nationwide 
paid effective tax rates, which include direct and indi- 
rect taxes, of between 43 and 52 percent from 1982 
through 1984. 
The available evidence indicates that 
banks generally have paid a low rate of direct taxes. 
However, if we account for indirect bank taxes, it is 
evident that the economic tax liability of banks at least 
begins to approach the average tax liability of nonfi- 
nancial c~rporations.~ 
1. See Gelfand, Matthew D., and Gerald k  Hanweck, 'The Effects of 
Tax Reform on Banks," The Bankeys Magazine, Jan.-Feb 1986, pp. 
59-66. 
2. See Taxation of Banks and Thrift Institutions,  Joint Committee on 
Taxation, March 9, 1983. 
3. See Survey of  U.S. Effective Income Tax Rates for the Banking 
Industry, Bank Administration Institute, 1982-84. 
4.  See Henderson, Yolanda K. "The Taxation of Banks: Particular Priv 
ileges or Objectionable Burdens?Neu~  England Economic Reuiezu, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, May/June 1987, pp. 3-18. 
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BOX 1 
v the industries Congress has singled out as low 
taxpayers, will pay approximately $10 billion of 
1  the higher corporate tax liability during the next 
five years (see box 1). According to estimates by 
I 
the industry itself, commercial banks could pay as 
much as $20 billion more in federal taxes during 
the next five years. 
Under the old corporate tax rules, a 
commercial bank could reduce its federal taxable 
income by claiming several deductions, including 
t  interest expenses on the holding of tax-exempt 
/  securities, a bad-debt reserve provis~on,  acceler- 
ated depreciation, and investment and foreign tax 
I 
credits (see table 1). The new tax code either 
repeals these tax preferences or substantially 
reduces the tax-deductible allowable amounts. 
The new code also imposes a much more strin- 
gent and complicated minimum corporate tax to 
ensure that no profitable corporation will avoid 
1  paying federal income taxes beginning in 1987. 
The former top corporate tax rate 
1  of 46 percent falls to 34 percent under the new 
I 
' 
rules. The revised rules also substitute two lower 
1  marginal rates on income up to $75,000 for the 
1  four previous lower marginal rates on income up 
to $100,000. A corporate tax rate of 15 percent 
will now apply to taxable income up to $50,000; 
I  a 25 percent rate will apply on income from 
I  $50,000 to $75,000. Under the new tax rules, cor- 
porations also will pay an additional 5 percent 
1  tax, up to a maximum of $11,750, on corporate 
I  taxable income from $100,000 to $335,000. A cor- 
I  poration with taxable income greater than 
I  $335,000 will pay a flat rate of 34 percent. 
Under the new rules, the future tax 
I  liability of large banks will be affected more 
severely than that of small and medium banks 
because tax reform repeals more deductions for 
I 
large banks. In particular, large banks not only 
1  lose the ability to use the reserve method of tax 
deduction for bad debt, but also must add their 
I  accumulated bad-debt reserves into taxable 
/  income during the next four years. 
11.  Taxes Paid by Ohio Banks Under 
I  Old Federal Income Tax Rules 
1  In our study, we estimate the average tax rate of 
291 Ohio banks that posted a 1985 profit. Seven- 
teen Ohio banks reporting a loss in 1985 were ex- 
cluded (there seems to be no systematic reason 
1  to explain why the excluded banks reported a 
loss). The profitable Ohio banks are divided into 
two groups: one includes 264 small and medium 
banks; the other includes 27 large banks. We first 
calculate the average direct tax rate for the 
sampled Ohio banks. This estimated average rate 
I  then serves as a benchmark against which we quan- 
titatively simulate how the new tax rules would 
have affected the 1985 tax liability of these banks. 
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Title  Old Tax Provision  New Tax Provision 
Effective Date  General Effective Date: Jan. 1,1987 
Corporate Rate Cuts: July 1, 1987 
Corporate Tax Rate  46% top rate, 4 lower  34% top rate, 2 lower rates 
rates on income up to $100,000  on income up to $75,000 
Corporate Minimum Tax  15% of the amount of which  20% alternative minimum 
the sum of tax preference  tax,  $40,000 income exemption 
items exceeds the greater of 
$10,000 or the regular tax liability 
Bad-Debt Reserve 
Tax-Exempt Securities 
Deductible  Eliminates bad-debt tax reserve 
for banks with more than $500 
million in assets 
80% of municipal bond  100% of municipal bond 
interest expense is exempt  interest expense is taxed 
from federal taxation 
Net Operating Loss Cartyover  Losses carried back 10 years  Losses carried back only 3 years, 
and forward 5 years  but forward 15 years 
I 
401(K)s and IRAs 
Foreign Tax Credit 
Depreciation 
401(K): $30,000 maximum  401(K): $7,000 maximum 
IRAs: $2,000/$250  IRAs: Limits imposed on high- 
for nonworking spouse  income workers with pensions 
Credit determined on  Less liberal foreign tax 
aggregated foreign income  credits, with transition provisions 
Accelerated  Less generous write-offs, particu-  ~ 
larly for real estate 
Investment Tax Credit  6% to 10%  Repealed  I 
Source: Ernst & Whinney. Tax Reform-1986, An Analysis of  Provisions Relating to the Financial Services Industry, E&W No. X58055; and 
Tax Reform-1986, An Analysis of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, E&W No. 66196. 
TABLE I 
Because Internal Revenue Service  in 1986. The banking business, of course, is not 
(1%)  tax returns are confidential, we manipulated 
financial information reported by the sampled 
Ohio banks in 1985 so that we could, in  effect, 
simulate their 1985 1%  returns. To do this, it was 
necessary to impose several simplifying assump- 
tions that possibly cause the estimates to deviate 
from the banks' actual IRS  tax returns. Despite 
this unavoidable shortcoming, the simulated 
results allow us to make reasonable inferences 
about the direction and the degree to which each 
of the tax changes potentially could affect the op- 
ical small-to-medium or large Ohio bank. 
As a final word of caution, we 
assume that banks, borrowers, other lenders, 
depositors, and other economic actors behave no 
differently under the new tax  rules than they did 
likely to remain static. Banks undoubtedly will 
restructure their balance sheets in order to lessen 
their burdens in  the new tax environment. Banks' 
balance sheets also will be influenced by induced 
tax-law changes in loan demand, by changes in 
investment yields, and by depositors' behavior. 
The simulation estilnates do not 
capture these unknown influences, or even the 
unknown degree of probable effects on banks' 
balance sheets in the future. Consequently, the 
simulated effects of the new tax code on Ohio 
banks are most likely a "worst-case" estimate of 
additional taxes they will pay. 
The probable adverse effects of the 
new tax rules on banks' tax liability also will be 
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,  major tax deductions that banks can use to 
I  Estimated 1985 Tax Liability of Ohio Banking  1  reduce their taxable income. Most of the differ- 
,  Organizations Under the New Federal Income Tax Code  j  ence between taxable and net income is attrib- 
(do~ars  in millions)  )  uted to tax-exempt income on municipal obliga 
I  Under Old  Under New  1  tions; to foreign, state, and local income and 
Tax Rules  Tax Rules  1  excise taxes; and to lower-taxed capital gains- 
small &  small &  which are subject to a 28 percent tax rate. Banks 
Medium  Large  Medium  Large  j  also are permitted to deduct a tax reserve for loan 
Banksa  Banksb  Banksa  Banksb  ----  I  losses that differs from their book bad-debt 
1. Pre-Tax Income  $284.8  $730.5  $284.8  $730.5  1  resew.  A reasonable estimate of the 1985 tax 
2.  TaxableIncome  $103.9  $314.4  $114.0  $437.1  bad-debt reserve is approximately 55 percent of 
3.  Regular Tax Liability  $43.2  $144.1  $  35.9  $148.3  the 1985 book bad-debt reserve.' 
4. Tax Credits  $5.5  $19.2  -  -  By  reducing banks' net income by 
5.  Add-on or  '  these tax deductions and after adjusting net 
Taxes  $  $ O.5  $ 9.4  $ 7.3  1  income for differences between book and tax 
6.  Net Tax Liability  $  38.1  $125.4  $45.3  $155.6  1  bad-debt reserves. we should get an unbiased 
7. Average Tax Rate  I  estimate of  Ohio banks' 1985 taxable income. 
(Am)  13.3%  17.1%  15.9%  21.3%  I  We  estimate that Ohio banks had 
A?li ofAU Ohio*  16.1%  19.8%  1985 federal taxable income of approximately 
$418 million (see table 2). Ohio banks paid an 
a.  Ohio banks with assets less than $500 million.  1  estimated regular tax liability of approximately 
b.  Ohio banks with assets greater than $500 million.  1  1  $187 million in 1985, which was partially offset by 
Source: Consolidated Repon of Condition and Income, December 31,1985.  1  tax credits of almost $25 million. Banks also paid 
I  I  an estimated add-on tax of approximately $1 mil- 
TABLE 2  lion. The combined net federal tax liability of  the 
Ohio banks-that  is, regular taxes, plus add-on  27 
mitigated because banks, to a large degree,  taxes, minus tax credits-amounted to almost 
merely serve as a conduit through which they  $164 million in 1985, which is an average tax rate 
intermediate tax benefits to their customers by  of 16.1 percent. 
extending them more favorable rates or terms on  The average tax rate paid by small- 
loans and leases-assuming that a competitive  and medium-size Ohio banks (13.3 percent) 
marketplace for these banking products exists. As  under the old tax rules was lower than that of  the 
we will discuss shortly, the consequence of elim-  large Ohio banks (17.1 percent). One reason that 
inating certain tax advantages will put upward  small- and medium-size Ohio banks paid a lower 
pressure (that is, for less-favorable terms) on loan  avenge tax rate is because they reported a rela- 
and lease rates, yielding higher average revenues  tively lower level of estimated taxable income. 
that will offset the elimination of banks' tax pref-  The lower taxable income of small- and medium- 
erences. However, higher lease rates could lead  size Ohio banks is attributed mostly to the fact 
to lower sales volume.  that they hold a higher percentage of their assets 
The newtax rules! moreover, phase  (as compared to large banks) in the form of 
out the deductibility of interest on consumer  municipal obligations. Another reason is that 
debt over a four-~ear  period, except for consumer  there was little difference between the effect that 
debt that is secured by a home mortgage. A likely  credits had on mitigating the tax liability of 
result of this action may be a widespread restruc-  either large, medium, or small Ohio banks. In 
turing of consumer debt. Under the new tax rules,  other words, small.  rnedium-~ize  Ohio banks 
many homeowners have an incentive to rely on  relied on tax credits to the same approximate rel- 
home-equity  credit lines, rather than on traditional  ,tive  degree that large banks relied on tax credits 
consumer credit like auto loans, as the tax-  to reduce their federal income tax liability. 
advantaged method to finance their purchases. 
Many commercial banks will have a comparative 
advantage as suppliers of home-equity credit lines 
because they typically have experience in both 
mortgage financing and open-end credit lending. 
In 1985, the 291 profitable Ohio 
banks reported net income of approximately 
..................O..OI....oO..D.........  0 
$1.02 billion. Because banks do not report taxa- 
ble income, it was necessary to estimate taxable 
Our estimate of the tax reserve deduct~on  is based on the results  1  of a US. Treasury bank tax model See Neubig, Thomas S and 
income from the banks' year-end 1985 Reports of  Martin A. Sull~van,  "The Effect of  the Repeal of  the Reserve Method on 
Condition and Income. A reasonable estimate of  ~oan-Loss  Reserves and Loan Charge-Offs," 1987 Tax Analysts,  Tax 
taxable income can be derived if  we subtract the  I  Notes, April 27,  1987, Special Report, pp. 401-403. 
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111. Principal Tax Provisions Affecting 
Commercial Banks 
Tax-Exempt Securities.  Under the old tax rules, 
commercial banks could deduct 80 percent of 
interest expenses that were incurred to carry tax- 
exempt securities in their asset portfolios. As a 
consequence, there was a strong incentive for 
commercial banks to hold municipal securities to 
reduce their federal tax burden. 
The new tax rules disallow 100 per. 
cent of the interest charge for carrying municipal 
obligations acquired after August 7,  1986. There 
is one exception: under the new tax rules, a 
municipality still will be permitted to sell up to 
$10 million of bonds to a financial institution per 
year, and the financial institution can apply the 
old interest expense disallowance rule (20 per- 
cent) to the bonds. 
Commercial banks are an integral 
part of the municipal bond market, and currently 
hold approximately one-third of outstanding 
municipal obligations. Unless tax-exempt yields 
S:imulated  Effects of New Federal Income Tax 
~des  on Ohio Banking Organizations 
All  Medium 
Banks  B&  -- 
12%  ll%d  1 
48%  44%  4 
13%  14%  13 
29%  30%  2 
: Consolidated Report of Condition and Income, December 31, 
TABLE 3 
rise substantially closer to yields on taxable secur- 
ities to compensate for the less-favorable tax sta- 
tus of municipals, banks will accumulate smaller 
future holdings of tax-exempt securities under 
the new tax rules. In all likelihood, the tax-law 
changes will hasten banks' exit from the tax- 
exempt municipal securities market, accelerating 
a trend that began in the mid-1970s. 
One alternative to holding munic- 
ipal obligations as a tax-sheltering device has 
been leasing receivables. Since 1981, large banks 
in particular have substituted leasing to varying 
degrees for tax-exempt securities as a more effec- 
tive way in which to shelter income. Under the 
old tax rules, banks were allowed a high degree 
of leveraging of investments in physical assets 
because of liberal depreciation schedules and 
investment tax credits (ITCs). Faster depreciation 
write-offs and ITCs magnify the net after-tax 
yields for asset leasing. In fact, the tax advantages 
of leasing have made it a profitable substitute for 
direct lending by banks. 
Small banks engage in virtually no 
leasing activity because they do not have the 
large and diverse portfolios to absorb the greater 
risk and lower liquidity associated with leasing 
receivables. A small bank, moreover, is less able 
to price its leasing products competitively 
because leasing normally requires a large volume 
to economically justify the expense of a special- 
ized leasing staff. 
Repealing the deduction for 
municipal-securities-interest expense will, other 
things being equal, raise taxable income for the 
typical commercial bank, unless other tax-shelter 
adjustments are made to offset elimination of the 
deduction. The relatively large amount of munici- 
pal bonds held by small and medium banks is 
their primary means for sheltering taxable 
income. It is likely that these banks have a higher 
percentage of municipal holdings because they 
primarily service local governments, whose debt 
is frequently purchased and held mostly by local 
financial institutions. In contrast, larger banks are 
located in large cities whose municipal debt is 
traded publicly. 
On the surface, it appears that 
large banks might be relatively less affected than 
small and medium banks by the loss of the 
municipal-interest-expense deduction because 
large banks have more tax-sheltering alternatives 
available to them. For example, large banks could 
in part substitute leasing activity for municipals as 
a way to shelter taxable income. But leasing 
becomes less attractive as a shelter under the new 
tax code because the code repeals ITCs and 
revises depreciation schedules for physical assets. 
In table 3, we report the simula- 
tion results of how each tax provision potentially 
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could affect the tax liabilities of Ohio banks. In 
interpreting the results, it should be pointed out 
that the simulated effects of each tax-reform pro- 
vision estimate how each tax change potentially 
could alter the Ohio banks' federal income tax 
liability, assuming all other provisions of the old 
tax law remain in effect. After isolating the effects 
of each individual tax provision, we simulate 
what potentially could happen to tax burdens 
when we impose all the new tax rules simultane- 
ously on the Ohio banks. 
The adverse effect of eliminating 
the deduction for municipal-securities-interest 
expense on Ohio banks' tax liabilities is lessened 
considerably because the new tax rules grand- 
father municipal bonds acquired before August 8, 
1986. If the new tax law had disallowed the 
municipal-securities-interest-expense  deduction 
entirely, the tax liability of all Ohio banks in 1985 
would have increased by 42 percent-and even 
more for small- and medium-size Ohio banks (49 
percent)-assuming that no other tax code provi- 
sions were changed (see table 3). Because small- 
and medium-size Ohio banks, on average, hold a 
higher percentage of their assets as municipal 
obligations, they will incur a slightly higher rela- 
tive tax liability from this single tax law change. 
However, under the grandfathering 
provisions of the new tax law, we assume that 
Ohio banks will retain at least 90 percent of their 
present  municipal-securities-interest-expense de- 
duction in 1987. According to our simulated re- 
sults, Ohio banks would have had a tax liability in 
1985 that was only 4 percent higher than if they 
had included 10 percent of securities interest ex- 
pense in their taxable income. Our simulations 
do not allow for the substitution of the maturing 
tax-exempt assets into higher-yielding  taxable 
assets. The higher portfolio returns from taxable 
interest-bearing assets will boost before-tax 
income and will provide an offset to higher taxes.z 
Loan-Loss Reserves,  Under the old 
tax rules, commercial banks, like other corpora- 
tions, can deduct contributions to a bad-debt 
reserve for tax purposes, rather than deduct debts 
when they become uncollectible. Unlike other 
corporations, however, banks must report a loan- 
loss provision for regulatoypurposes that differs 
from the amount reported for tax purposes. The 
level of the regulatov reserve, which in recent 
years has exceeded the amount that is tax deduct- 
ible, is based on examiners' appraisal of the qual- 
ity of each bank's loan portfolio. 
~~~~eae~a...~o...o.......*...o~.o...~e...e 
See  O'Brien, James M. and Matthew D. Gelfand, "Effects of  the  2  Tax  Reform Act of 1986 on Commercial Banks." O'Brien and Gel- 
fand's results allow for the substitution of maturing tax-exempt bonds 
into taxable interest-bearing obligations. According to their simulations, 
the higher taxable yields would substantially offset the significant 
increase in bank taxes. 
The old tax law required that a 
commercial bank determine its bad-debt reserve 
deduction for tax purposes by using one of two 
methods: the experience method or the percen- 
tage  method. Under the experience method, a 
bank bases its loan-loss deduction on the average 
loan losses of the previous six years. Under the 
percentage method, a bank deducts provisions to 
a loan-loss reserve equal to 0.6 percent of eligible 
loans outstanding. 
Under the new tax rules, large 
banks will be permitted to take deductions for 
bad debts only when loans become partially or 
wholly worthless. Many bank tax observers 
believe that this will accelerate charging off bad 
debts by large banks.3 Even ignoring the tax con- 
sequences that repealing the bad-debt reserve 
provision will have for large banks, there might 
be prudent reasons, according to these observers, 
for retaining the bad-debt reserve for all banks. 
The rationale for this argument is that most banks 
operate under accrual accounting standards and, 
as a consequence, bank income is taxed whether 
or not it is received. If  loans are charged off only 
when they become uncollectible, a bank would 
mismatch its expenses and income. This mis- 
match could be avoided by establishing a proper 
bad-debt reserve that represented the present 
value of economic losses already embedded in a 
bank's loan portfolio. However, neither tax 
accounting rules nor generally accepted account- 
ing principles (GAAP) adjust future losses to their 
present values. 
Under the new tax code, large 
banks (banks with assets over $500 million) also 
must recapture their existing bad-debt reserves by 
reporting them as income over the next four years 
-10  percent in 1987,20 percent in 1988,30 per- 
cent in 1989, and 40 percent in 1990.4 The new 
3 
Proponents of the loan-loss reserve method of accounting for bad 
debts contend that if commercial banks were allowed to charge 
off loans only when they become bad,  we might recreate the pre-1921 
atmosphere of  dispute between banks and the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS). Prior to 1921,  when banks had to write off bad loans either in full 
or not at all, there were constant disputes between banks and the IRS 
about the timing of  the deduction for bad loans. It has recently been 
argued that this claim is incorrect. To  the contrary, the repeal of the tax 
bad-debt reserve method will eliminate the incentive to accelerate loan 
chargeoffs. See  Neubig, Thomas S. and Martin A. Sullivan, (1987). 
4 
Commercial banks have two other options for recapturing existing 
reserves under the new tax rules. One  option permits a bank to 
recapture more than 10 percent in 1987 and then recapture the remain- 
ing reserve as follows: 219  in 1988, 113 in 1989, and 419  in 1990.  The 
other option permits a bank to retain the reserve method for existing 
loans and to reduce the balance as loans are charged off (referred to as 
the cut-off method). Under  the cut-off method, a bank can still deduct 
for tax purposes net charge-offs in excess of the reserve amount. 
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tax rules exempt a large bank from this recapture 
of  bad-debt reserves only when it is in trouble-- 
defined as being when a bank's nonperforming 
assets exceed 75 percent of its equity capital. 
If we ignore the exemption of 
small- and medium-size banks under the new tax 
rules, all Ohio banks would have paid 7 percent 
more in 1985 taxes if  they had written off bad 
loans instead of &ng  a bad-debt tax reserve 
deduction.  Also, if  all banks were subject to a 
recapture of 10 percent of  their accumulated bad- 
debt reserve in 1985, their 1985 tax liability 
would have risen by approximately 12 percent. 
With the small- and medium-size 
banks exempted, however, the estimated tax lia- 
bilities for the loss of  bad-debt tax reserve and 
the loan-loss recapture would have been approx- 
imately 8 percent and 12 percent, respectively, for 
the large banks (assets over $500 million)- 
which are subject to exclusion of the bad-debt 
reserve deduction under the new tax rules. 
If the new tax code had not exempt- 
ed small- and medium-size banks, the recapture 
of 10 percent of accumulated loan-loss reserves 
and the nondeductibility of a bad-debt tax reserve 
would have affected these banks slightly less than 
the effect that these provisions had on the tax lia- 
bility of large Ohio banks. The progressive recap- 
ture of the accumulated bad-debt reserve into tax- 
able income, moreover, will have a significant 
effect on the tax liability of large banks in 1989 
and 1990. If  Ohio's large banks (assets greater than 
$500 million) had captured 40 percent of the bad- 
debt reserve into 1985 taxable income, this 
would have boosted their tax liability by almost 
50 percent (see table 3, Tax bad-debt accumu- 
lated reserve, capturing 40 percent of reserve.) 
Investment Tax Credits and 
Depreciation Write-offs.  Because of  ITCs and 
accelerated depreciation write-offs, banks have 
found it advantageous, from a tax perspective, to 
add lease receivables as a partial substitute for 
municipal securities and direct loans. In 1981, 
Congress allowed businesses to accelerate the 
recovery of their investments under the acceler- 
ated cost recovery system (ACRS)  because the 
inflationary environment at that time distorted the 
real cost of capital. However, the inflation rate has 
improved significantly in recent years. As a con- 
sequence, ACRS  amounts to a generous tax break 
because it depreciates an asset completely much 
sooner than the end of  the asset's actual useful 
life. The new tax rules correct this distortion by 
slowing the rate of depreciation write-offs. 
The elimination of ITCs, first author- 
ized in 1962 and raised to 10 percent in 1975, 
will severely undercut the tax incentives of banks 
to engage in leasing receivables. The slowing of 
ACRS  will have a similar, but less severe, slowing 
effect  on  the  leasing activities of  commercial 
banks. The likely response of commercial banks 
to the elimination of  ITCs and to less-liberal 
depreciation write-offs should be a repricing and 
possible reduction of  their leasing activities. On 
the other hand, because banks lose their interest 
deductions for tax-exempt bonds, they will have 
an incentive to reinvest some of  their cash flow 
into leasing. Lease receivables presently represent 
only a small percentage of  total bank assets and, 
on balance, the new tax rules will not cause 
commercial banks to add a significantly higher 
percentage of their assets to leasing activities. 
In 1985, Ohio banks claimed 
almost $22 million of ITCs to reduce their tax lia- 
bilities. If  they were not allowed to deduct ITCs 
in 1985, their tax liability would have risen 
approximately 13 percent. 
Foreign Tax Credits.  The new tax 
rules impose limitations on foreign tax credits 
(ETCs). Tighter rules on FTCs will affect primarily 
multinational banking organizations, particularly 
the New York-based money center bank holding 
companies. Some New York multinational bank- 
ing organizations receive more than 50 percent of 
their reported net earnings from foreign opera- 
tions or foreign assets. 
Under the old tax rules, commer- 
cial banks could claim a tax credit against U.S. 
corporate income tax liabilities that was directly 
proportionate to foreign taxes that they paid. 
Otherwise, banks would have been taxed twice 
on their foreign income, once abroad and once at 
home. The foreign tax credit is limited to the 
amount of U.S. federal income taxes that, in 
effect, would be paid to the U.S. government on a 
bank's foreign income. 
Because commercial banks were re- 
quired to report only aggregated foreign income 
under the old tax rules, they could maximize 
their FTCs. Under the old tax rules, a U.S.- 
domiciled bank with international operations 
could originate foreign loans in a high-tax coun- 
try (where the tax rate exceeded the U.S. tax rate) 
and in a low-tax country (where the tax rate fell 
below the U.S. tax rate). Because the old tax rules 
allowed banks to average (or aggregate) loans from 
both foreign countries, a bank could claim total 
foreign taxes as a credit on its U.S. income taxes. 
Under the new tax code, commer- 
cial banks will face a new limitation on how 
much they will be allowed to average their tax 
credits from low- and high-tax foreign countries. 
However, there is a transition rule to allow a 
phase-out of the old tax rules over five years on 
loans extended to 33 countries (generally the 
high-tax countries) that currently are receiving 
financial assistance under written agreements 
with the International Monetary Fund. 
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The new tax provisions on FTCs 
will have little effect on the 1987 tax liabilities of 
most Ohio banks because these banks generally 
have low amounts of foreign assets as a percen- 
tage of  total banking assets. Only the largest Ohio 
banks reported FTCs in 1985. Even if  we esti- 
mated a worst-case situation in which ETCs  are 
deducted from income instead of deducted from 
tax liability, the simulated effect on large Ohio 
banks' tax liability would be minor, adding only 1 
percent to their 1985 tax liability. 
Alternative Minimum Tax. Com- 
mercial banks now pay what amounts to an add- 
on tax of approximately 15 percent of  the amount 
by which selected preference items or deductions 
exceed either $10,000 or a bank's net tax liability.5 
The selected preference items include capital 
gains, accelerated depreciation, and excess loan- 
loss provisions. The purpose of this add-on tax is 
to counteract the effect that tax-preference items 
have on reducing taxable income. 
In 1985, add-on taxes represented, 
on average, less than $1 million of the net tax lia- 
bility of all sampled Ohio banks (see table 2, line 
5). Our estimations of add-on taxes for Ohio 
banks are low because they exclude capital gains 
and excess accelerated depreciation as part of the 
add-on tax base. Neither category can be esti- 
mated with any reasonable accuracy from availa- 
ble financial data. However, this does not result 
in seriously underestimating the add-on taxes of 
Ohio banks, because capital gains and excess 
accelerated depreciation are typically small addi- 
tions to the add-on tax base of  most Ohio banks. 
It is worth noting that banks report all securities 
gains, regardless of the length of time held by 
them, as ordinaty income for tax purposes. 
Tax reform repeals the present 
add-on tax and replaces it with a new alternative 
minimum tax (AMT) that imposes a strict minimum 
tax of 20 percent. To compute the AMT,  a bank 
must add together its regular taxable income and 
certain tax preferences that represent its alterna- 
tive minimum income. After exempting $40,000 of 
this amount, a bank must multiply its alternative 
income by 20 percent; its tax will be the greater 
value either of its regular tax or of the AMT.  The 
tax  preferences include bad-debt reserves in 
excess of the deduction based on the experience 
method (small- and medium-size banks only); 
interest income on private-purpose,  tax-exempt 
bonds issued after August 7, 1986; and 50 percent 
of book-value income that is not already subject 
to the minimum tax that will include, for the 
most part, tax-exempt income for banks. 
15 
See  Ernst & Whinney, Tax  Reform-1986, An Analysis of Provi- 
sions Relating to the Financial Services Industry, p.  18. 
Our simulations indicate that the 
AMT will have less effect on large Ohio banks 
than on small- and medium-size Ohio banks. The 
elimination of tax preferences ensures that the 
large Ohio banks will pay at least the minimum 
tax amount. Our simulations indicate that the 
AMT  would represent only 8 percent of all Ohio 
banks' total tax liability. However, for small- and 
medium-size banks, the AMT  will represent a sig- 
nificantly higher proportion (almost 21 percent) 
of their estimated 1985 tax liability under the new 
tax provisions. 
During the next four years, the 
recapture of existing loan-loss reserves by large 
banks will gradually boost their taxable income. 
Consequently, large Ohio banks will almost 
assuredly, on average, pay the top marginal tax 
rate. For small- and medium-size Ohio banks, the 
AMT  will be a much larger percentage of net 
taxes for two reasons: (1) these banks retain 
more tax preferences and (2) they have relatively 
more book-income adjustment as a result of their 
relatively larger holdings of  municipal securities. 
Net  Operating Loss  Carry-overs. 
Under present tax law, corporations may carry 
over current net operating losses (NOIs) to offset  31 
tax liabilities in past and future years. Most corpo- 
rations are allowed to carry losses back three years 
and to carry them forward 15 years (losses must 
be carried back first). Banks, however, are allowed 
to carry NOLs  back 10 years and forward five 
years. Banks received favorable treatment of NOIs 
at a time when Congress was reducing the reserve 
allowance that was permitted for bad debts. Con- 
sequently, if  a bank incurred an unusually large 
debt write-off, favorable treatment of  NOIs would 
reduce the financial strain on the bank. 
The new tax code retains existing 
NOL  rules for pre-1987 losses. NOIs arising in 
1987 and thereafter will be subject to the same 
rules that apply now to other nonfinancial corpo- 
rations. However, existing NOL  rules will be 
retained for some losses occurring after 1987, but 
prior to 1994. 
The special NOL  rules that now 
apply to depository institutions provide a cushion 
against large current losses. Under present NOL 
rules, a bank receives a tax savings immediately 
because operating losses are carried back 10 
years to reduce past tax liabilities. Moreover, the 
prospect of future earnings against which cany- 
forwards could be offset is not certain for many 
banks. The effect of adopting the new rules is that 
carry-overs would reduce future tax liabilities 
more than past tax liabilities. What this means is 
that the new NOL  rules will provide less assis- 
tance to financially ailing banks. 
401(K) and lRA Programs.  A sec- 
tion 401(K) plan is an employer-sponsored pro- 
gram under which employees can defer a portion 
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of  their pay in investment accounts until retire- 
ment under that provision of the Internal Revenue 
Code. IRAs  are deposits in individual retirement 
accounts that are deductible fiom current income. 
Under the new tax code, high- 
income taxpayers who are covered by a pension 
plan would forgo the tax deduction for an IRA. 
However, individuals who are not covered by 
employer-maintained retirement plans, including 
401(K) plans, are subject to the old tax code as it 
applies to IRA deductions. The new tax rules also 
reduce the maximum annual contribution that an 
individual can make to a 401(K) plan. 
Annual IRA  contributions will 
probably decline because of the new tax-code re- 
strictions on IRAs, and banks will partially lose a 
stable, long-term source of deposits. The drop-off 
in IRAs  could be offset if a supplier of  IRA ac- 
counts, like a bank, could successfully encourage 
more lower- to middle-income individuals to use 
IRA  accounts. Today, commercial banks and sav- 
ings and loans together control almost one-third 
of  the approximately $225 billion IRA  market. 
Opponents of the IRA  tax changes 
contend that small banks could be forced out of 
the IRA market under the new IRA restrictions. 
This could occur, they argue, if the new IRA 
changes required banks to install sophisticated 
computer software to distinguish between 
deductible and nondeductible IRA  contributions. 
This is not likely to happen, however, because 
small banks could easily purchase the necessary 
computer software. 
IV. Conclusion 
The intent of the new corporate income tax rules 
is to raise the federal tax liability of commercial 
banks. According to our simulation results, the 
new tax rules would have reduced Ohio banks' 
1985 tax liabilities by approximately 15 percent if 
only the lower corporate tax rates were in effect 
at that time (see table 3). When the composite 
effects  of the new tax rules are simulated simul- 
taneously, however, the tax liabilities of all Ohio 
banks would have increased by almost 30 per- 
cent in 1985 under the new tax rules. This com- 
putes to an average tax rate for all Ohio banks of 
almost 20 percent, as compared to an actual aver- 
age rate of 16.1 percent. The average tax rate of 
Ohio's larger banks will increase fiom 17.1 per- 
cent to 21.3 percent; for small- and medium-size 
Ohio banks, the higher average tax rate of 15.9 
percent compares to an actual estimated average 
rate of 13.3 percent. 
However, even though taxes paid 
by Ohio banks will likely be higher, their profita- 
bility may be largely unaffected to the extent that 
they can offset the higher tax expense by adjust- 
ing their lending, service prices, and other activi- 
ties. Banks would pay higher taxes, but net profits 
could be largely unaffected because of higher 
pre-tax income. 
Ohio's larger banks will pay pro- 
gressively higher average tax rates in 1988 and in 
subsequent years (assuming they make no port- 
folio adjustments) because the new tax rules 
phase in several tax-increasing provisions. Iarge 
banks will gradually lose the transition rules for 
FTCs for developing countries and must progres- 
sively recapture existing bad-debt reserves into 
current income, particularly in 1989 and 1990. 
The loss of  ETCs  is of little consequence to 
Ohio's larger banks. However, the recapture of 
loan-loss reserves will boost large banks' taxable 
income significantly in 1989 and 1990. 
The adverse effect of  losing the 
bad-debt reserve on large banks' tax liabilities is 
reduced because, regardless of the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986, the percentage method of calculating the 
bad-debt provision will be eliminated after 1987, 
in accordance with a 1969 statute. That is, in 
1988, all banks must adopt the experience method 
of calculating their annual loan-loss provision. 
Nonetheless, the elimination of 
large banks' loan-loss provision for tax purposes 
remains a controversial issue. The traditional view 
of loan-loss reserves contends that its removal for 
tax purposes could have potentially serious con- 
sequences because such action would weaken 
the safety and soundness of our commercial 
banking system. Removal of  loan-loss reserves 
would presumably reduce the margin of safety 
available to banks for coping with unexpected 
financial shocks.6 Advocates of  reinstating the tax 
deductibility of the loan-loss provision contend 
that it is not a tax shelter for commercial banks. 
Instead, the loan-loss reserve should be viewed 
as a proper method for commercial banks, either 
large, medium, or small, to amortize losses that 
now are embedded in their loan portfolios, and 
to build up reserves against potential financial 
strains in the future. Removing the tax deduction 
for a loan-loss provision for large banks gives 
these banks less incentive to build reserves to 
protect themselves against potential losses. 
Those who favor eliminating the 
loan-loss provision argue that its loss as a tax 
deduction will have little effect on the safety and 
I 
At present, bank regulators are encouraging banks to build up 
their bad-debt reserves because segments of the banking industry 
are afflicted with problems from their foreign, energy, and farm loans. 
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soundness of the banking system? They empha- 
size the fact that tax-purpose reserve positions do 
not determine GAAP  reserve measures. In a bank's 
financial statements, it reports a loan-loss reserve 
that estimates expected future losses in its loan 
portfolio. For tax purposes, a bank has two choices 
in calculating its deductible loan-loss provision: 
(1) it can deduct its actual losses, or (2) it can 
deduct a maximum percentage of its eligible 
loans or deduct the average of current loan losses 
and previous five-year losses. Since tax and 
accounting rules for bad-debt reserves differ, the 
reserve method would not change a bank's provi- 
sion for bad debt in its financial statement. 
Given this, the effect on a bank's 
safety and soundness of a tax-related elimination 
of the loan-loss provision is pertinent only to the 
extent that it reduces after-tax income. Moreover, 
the elimination of the loan-loss provision, or 
even the recapture of existing loan-loss reserves 
per se is not the relevant issue, but rather how 
the new tax law's combined provisions will affect 
total after-tax bank income. To the extent that 
after-tax bank income is largely unaffected by the 
tax provisions, there would be little effect on the 
soundness of the banking system. 
Proponents of eliminating loan-loss- 
reserve deductibility further claim that bank sound- 
ness will not be impaired because the removal of 
any tax incentives to bolster loan-loss reserves 
will merely cause an accounting adjustment with- 
out causing any change in a bank's primary capi- 
tal. A bank's primary capital provides a cushion of 
protection against loan losses. Primary capital is 
the sum of funds accumulated through share issu- 
ance and accumulated net earnings after dividends 
are paid. Those who oppose the elimination of the 
tax deduction of loan-loss reserves argue that it is 
an item that directly affects bank soundness. Pro- 
ponents of eliminating the loan-loss reserve point 
out that the reserve is essentially an accounting 
tool that provides information on the expected 
losses incurred in a bank's loan portfolio. 
For regulatory purposes, primary 
capital equals equity capital, plus the loan-loss 
reserve. Although the level of loan-loss reserves 
should reflect potential loan losses, a bank has 
some latitude to add or subtract from its loss 
reserves. If  there are tax incentives favoring loan- 
loss reserves, then a bank would find it desirable 
to adjust its accounting statements to report a 
larger provision. It would be desirable fi-om the 
bank's perspective to increase the reserve provi- 
sion by making an accounting adjustment to its 
equity capital so that the bank did not increase its 
primary capital. 
If a higher level of primary capital 
is desired by a bank, it has two options: issue 
additional equity or capita-qualifying notes, or 
reduce dividends. Whether a bank issues addi- 
tional equity or capital-qualifpg notes, however, 
will depend critically on market conditions and 
on the bank's financial condition, and is not a 
consequence of how the bank reports its 
accounting statements. It follows that if  tax incen- 
tives to add book loan-loss reserves are elimi- 
nated, a bank would adjust its accounting state- 
ments and would not alter its capital position. 
For a complete discussion of this view, see O'Brien, James M. 
and Matthew D.  Gelfand, "Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
on Commercial Banks," 1987 Tax Analysts, Tax Notes, February 9,  1987, 
Special Report  #I. 
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